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MEETING BY SIGNALS, PLAYING BY NORMS:
COMPLEMENTARY ACCOUNTS OF NONLEGAL
COOPERATION IN INSTITUTIONS
Edward Rock*
Michael Wachter**
Professor Eric A. Posner has written a fascinating book about
"Law and Social Norms."' In it, he uses an informal signaling
model (derived from Michael Spence's formal model)2 to explain a
wide range of striking social behavior, and to show underlying
connections among apparently disparate phenomena. Looking at
topics as dissimilar as gift giving, family law, criminal law, voting
and political participation, and commercial practice, he argues
that much of observed social behavior can be understood as the
result of attempts to signal that one is a good cooperator.
Posner's book stands at the intersection of two literatures: the
economics literature on signaling and screening; and the legal lit-
erature on "norms." Posner's goal is to use the signaling and
screening literature to make a contribution to the "norms" litera-
ture, an area in which we have worked as well. His claim is that
the signaling model will provide a methodology for understanding
the relationship between the law and the nonlegal mechanisms of
cooperation, and can explain many or most such mechanisms.
This immediately raises a question of "fit." Can signaling provide
the basic model for understanding norms? When is it useful?
When does it break down? Are other models more promising?
* Saul A. Fox Distinguished Professor of Business Law and Co-Director, Institute
for Law and Economics, University of Pennsylvania Law School.
** William B. Johnson Professor of Law and Economics and Co-Director, Institute for
Law and Economics, University of Pennsylvania Law School.
1. EmC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS (2000).
2. See A. MICHAEL SPENCE, MARKET SIGNALING: INFORMATIONAL TRANSFER IN
HIRING AND RELATED SCREENING PROCESSES (1974).
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One way to get a handle on these questions is to take a discrete
issue and see how different models handle it. Although Posner
proposes that his model can be applied generally to all areas of
nonlegal cooperation, he does acknowledge that some competing
models can provide alternative explanations. One of these, the
bounded rationality model, is the framework within which we
have written. Like Posner's informal signaling model, our ap-
proach relies on norms, rather than legal rules, to constrain the
parties from defecting from cooperative behavior by acting oppor-
tunistically. How do the two analyses match up? Where do they
overlap? Where do they differ?
Posner opens Chapter Two, A Model of Cooperation and the
Production of Social Norms, with an important example, the em-
ployment relationship.3 The employer has a high wage job va-
cancy that it can offer to an individual. The job requires a high
level of cooperation and skill. Because of its high wage, many in-
dividuals may be interested in the job. If the hiring and training
of employees were costless there would be no issue. The firm
could simply hire individuals and then discharge them as soon as
they proved to lack the cooperative spirit.
The problem confronting the employer and the potential em-
ployees is that hiring and training are expensive. If the employer
pays for the training, it suffers a loss if, after the training period,
it determines that the person hired misrepresented her skill and
cooperative spirit. If the potential employee bears the cost of
training, the employer, if untrustworthy, could renege by paying
a lower wage than originally offered, perhaps claiming that the
employee turned out to be lower skilled than the employer origi-
nally believed. Since the employer and the potential employee
will both be aware of these possibilities, a value enhancing em-
ployment opportunity will be lost unless the potential for oppor-
tunism can be constrained.
How do the employer and the potential employee convince each
other to take the gamble, the employer by hiring and training the
potential employee and the latter by working with the appropri-
ate work effort and skill? As a descriptive matter, the parties
handle this issue, like many others in the employment relation-
3. POSNER supra note 1, at 11.
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ship, through modes of nonlegal cooperation.4 The employment
example thus provides a fertile context in which to compare Pos-
ner's model with competitors.
In this essay, we will first review the signaling model, then
compare Posner's treatment of the employment relationship with
our own. This will provide a foundation for examining the scope of
Posner's inquiry and the contribution of signaling models to the
understanding of nonlegal modes of cooperation within institu-
tions like firms.
THE SIGNALING MODEL
Posner's book draws on the economic literature on signaling
and screenings.5 This literature starts from the observation that,
in the presence of asymmetric information, and absent the ability
to verify needed information directly, parties may use signals
based on observable variables to convey information that can
serve as a proxy for the needed information. Asymmetric informa-
tion exists when one actor, the informed party, has private infor-
mation or access to information at a much lower cost than an-
other actor, the uninformed party, with whom she is dealing.
In this regard, consider a typical employment context. Suppose,
for example, that an employer is seeking to hire an employee to a
high wage job that requires a cooperative work attitude and con-
siderable skill. A prospective employee is informed as to her own
skills and work attitudes. The employer is uninformed as to these
traits and since the prospective employee has just applied for the
job, there is no way that that the informed employee can provide
the information in a manner that is verifiable. Suppose, however,
that good social manners and more formal dress and appearance
(the signal) are correlated with high skill and good work attitude
(the needed information). The uninformed party, unable to verify
the desired information directly (the prospective employee's pro-
ductivity), will screen the signal (manners and dress) and inter-
pret it to determine whether to assume that the informed party
will be a cooperative person with whom to deal.
4. Id. at 15.
5. See, e.g., SPENCE, supra note 2.
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In contrast to the "norms" literature, in which there is little
agreement even as to what is meant by the term "norms,"6 much
less how it should be modeled,7 the signaling model works in a
very specific manner and through a limited channel.' A classic
example is college education and employment. It is widely agreed
that college graduates are offered better jobs than are high school
graduates. Why is this the case? A simple answer is that employ-
ers assume that students learn lots of useful things in college
that will improve their future productivity. Employers hire col-
lege graduates according to this view because college training
makes for more productive workers. In this model, education is
not a signal of high skill; rather it is a causal factor and one of its
component parts.
The signaling model tells an alternative story. Suppose stu-
dents learn nothing of future relevance, and the import of a col-
lege degree is only to sort out those who have high IQs, will com-
plete homework assignments, and are willing to grind out
numerous hours fulfilling the irrelevant assignments, from those
who fail either on account of lower IQ, unwillingness to do as-
signed tasks, or a preference not to work long hours. Here educa-
tion is a signal: it has no intrinsic positive effect on students' pro-
ductivity as employees. Instead it is positively correlated, but not
causally so, with intelligence, cooperativeness and productivity?
Although this identifies education as a potential signal, other
factors are required for it to be a successful one. Return again to
our employer, who now has two jobs, a low skilled job and a high
skilled job. Assume that the productivity of the high skilled job,
over a career, is worth $200,000 more than that of the low skilled
job. Suppose that high skilled students can graduate from college
at a cost of $50,000, while low skilled students would face a cost
of $201,000. The higher cost for low skilled students can be ex-
plained by the fact that it may take them longer to graduate, they
might need to spend additional amounts on remedial training, or
6. See Marcel Kahan, The Limited Significance of Norms for Corporate Governance,
149 U. PA. L. REV. 1869, 1870 (2001).
7. See Oliver Hart, Norms and the Theory of the Firm, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1701, 1701
(2001).
8. See John G. Riley, Silver Signals: Twenty-Five Years of Screening and Signaling,
39 J. ECON. LITERATURE 432 (2001).
9. See SPENCE, supra note 2, at 358-60.
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any number of other factors. In this example, the high skilled
student attends college, is subsequently offered the high skilled
job and thus receives the additional $200,000 in compensation,
with a net gain of $150,000. The low skilled student does not
mimic the signal because she would lose $1,000 in doing so. Here,
the signal works because the low skilled student does not attend
and graduate from college and does not get the job offer.
This example illustrates the conditions that a behavior must
exhibit in order to constitute a signal. Using Posner's distinction
between cooperative good-types and non-cooperative bad-types,
the signal must be costly, and have a higher cost to the non-
cooperative type. ° The benefit of signaling to the non-cooperative
type must be lower than the cost of the signal. Both the employer
and at least the cooperative-type must understand that the be-
havior in question is understood to be a signal by all interested
parties. Finally, the behavior is undertaken for purposes of sig-
naling and not for other purposes."
This last condition is an important one. If individuals attend
college because it increases their productivity, because all their
friends do it, or because it is a great place to meet one's future
spouse, then education is not a signal. In this case, students are
not attending college to send a signal to prospective employers.
To be a labor market signal, the behavior has to be motivated (en-
tirely, in the case of a pure signal) by a desire to communicate
one's cooperative nature to the employer.
Does this model offer general applicability to problems such as
the employment relationship given above? Or is there something
very specific about the education problem in terms of the rela-
tionship between the parties? In our example, the employer
doesn't know the employee or vice versa, other than by reputa-
tion. The employee's signals are thus important in the employer's
initial screening of potential employees. But does signaling re-
main important or as important once the employee is hired?
Generally, signaling and screening are most important when
the parties are unable to verify claimed skills and behavioral
traits. The signals are not better than information about the re-
quired traits, but they are the best mechanism for learning about
10. POSNER, supra note 1, at 26.
11. Id.
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them. Because of this feature, the signaling and screening litera-
tures have been prominent in a few distinctive areas of econom-
ics.
In industrial organization, for example, Antitrust laws impose
legal restrictions on the ability of competing firms to cooperate
and coordinate behavior. In such a setting, competitors can ob-
serve each other's public behavior, but much goes on privately.
Private behavior, by contrast, can only be observed at great cost
and with significant legal risk. Signaling in this context is of
great importance, and its importance is not reduced over time: no
matter how long the competitors interact, they still cannot legally
coordinate their behavior. Consequently, in the industrial organi-
zation literature, particularly in modeling the behavior among
competitors or a potential entrant and an established firm, sig-
naling models play a major role.12
The same is true, but to a lesser extent, in the firm's dealings
with customers and suppliers. In first establishing a relationship,
the parties have little directly relevant information upon which to
base decisions. Signals, based on irrelevant factors that are corre-
lated with the relevant information are a good substitute. In this
setting, signaling plays a critical communication role.
A key feature of the situations in which signaling models are
important is that the flow of observable information does not sig-
nificantly improve over time. Returning to the industrial organi-
zation examples, competitors, because of both competitive and le-
gal reasons, continue to need signals to coordinate and
communicate otherwise unobservable information. 13
But in a host of situations, the shortage of verifiable informa-
tion is resolved within a relevant time period. In the employment
relationship, once the employee is on the job, the employer has
the option of tracking actual performance, since now productivity
becomes observable. While it is true that monitoring performance
is costly and perfect monitoring is even more costly, the alterna-
tive is to continue to rely entirely on signals. Even if the employee
12. See, e.g., George J. Mailaith, Simultaneous Signaling in an Oligopoly Mode, 104
Q.J. ECON. 417, 417-27 (1989); Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, Limit Pricing and Entry
Under Incomplete Information: An Equilibrium Analysis, 50 ECONOMETRICA 443, 443-59
(1982).
13. See Milgrom & Roberts, supra note 12, at 443-59.
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reports to work well-suited in their dress, showing easy use of the
best manners, it is always better to check the work product from
time to time. In an ongoing relationship, those using the signal-
ing model must be able to show that it is more costly to monitor
the required traits, or productivity (even episodically) than to use
signals that are causally irrelevant to the required traits, or pro-
ductivity. While signaling is likely to continue as relationships
become more established, performance more observable, and
communications more established, in such cases, signals are
likely to play a peripheral rather than a primary role.
POSNER'S MODEL
One of Posner's contributions is to link the signaling model de-
scribed above to the norms literature. In Posner's model, norms
are behavioral regularities that serve as "nonlegal mechanisms of
cooperation." 4 So defined, norms are equivalent to the signals of
the signaling model.
The behavioral regularities or norms of interest to Posner are
those that involve social behavior and thus are most usefully la-
beled "social norms." 5 In Posner's view, gift-giving, wearing ap-
propriate clothes and engaging in appropriate speech are primar-
ily used to signal to another individual or to a group that the
signaler is a cooperative person who can be trusted. 6 The signals
convey private information to other actors who can then better
predict whether the individual signaler is cooperative or non-
cooperative. 7
Posner's focus on "social norms" or signals is different from the
economic literature where the signals generally involve behavior
affecting economic or business actions. For example, in the job in-
terview setting, the potential employee's level of education is not
the signal of interest to Posner. Instead, Posner's potential em-
ployee will dress well, speak politely, express mainstream opin-
ions, and avoid mentioning any idiosyncratic groups to which he
belongs.'" On this account, the employee shows up for the inter-
14. POSNER, supra note 1, at 4.
15. Id. at 5.
16. Id. at 22.
17. Id. at 22-23.
18. Id. at 13.
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view in a Brioni suit, the mark of a person well-suited for the po-
sition, and makes all the expected signals, some of which have
very low cost. The interviewer understands that the suit costs
$1,500 and that the young employee would just as soon wear
jeans. He also recognizes the polite speech for what it is intended
to show. The interviewer understands that the employee is of the
cooperative tribe. The non-cooperative type, who was not hired,
did all the wrong things, including dressing in jeans and speaking
informally.
In defining norms, there are two components. One is the fact
that they are behavioral regularities. 9 A second component is
also necessary: there must be a mechanism for its nonlegal en-
forcement." What makes a particular behavioral regularity a
norm is that individuals adopt the behavior because it is costly to
them if they do not. In Posner's model, within the group of coop-
erative-types, the primary enforcement mechanism is the fear
that one's reputation will be harmed if one defects from the
norm.
2 1
Having laid out these elements, one encounters a certain ambi-
guity in Posner's analysis. It could be that a signaling theory can
explain the observed social norms highlighted by Posner, such as
gift giving, wearing ties, etc. Or, it could be that the signaling be-
havior that manifests itself in social norms can explain the pat-
terns of nonlegally enforced cooperation that we observe in nu-
merous economic relationships. On one level, Posner appears to
have the more modest goal of explaining why people conform to
social norms.22 But he also holds out hope that his approach de-
velops a general model of nonlegal cooperation.23
In the case of the employment relationship, one can formulate
the issue as follows. Is the goal of Posner's inquiry to understand
some particular elements of the employment relationship, like the
19. Id. at 26.
20. Id. at 12.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 4. "The question left unanswered by law and economics is why people con-
form to social norms. Without an answer to that question, one cannot understand the ef-
fect of laws on people's behavior." Id.
23. Id. at 5. "Scholars need a methodology that enables a systematic analysis of the
relationship between the law and nonlegal mechanisms of cooperation. This book proposes
such a methodology." Id.
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fact that people wear suits to job interviews? Or is the goal
broader, namely, to explain the pervasive features of the em-
ployment relationship, a relationship that is primarily one of
nonlegally enforced cooperation? In other words, is Posner's claim
that the signaling model can provide a theory of the use of "social
norms" or a theory of the "employment relationship"?
A lot depends on this. If the goal and use of the model is to un-
derstand "social norms," such as why people dress up for job in-
terviews, weddings, funerals and (sometimes) academic confer-
ences, then the analysis is important and interesting for those
people who care about such phenomena and their relation to the
law. Moreover, it can be evaluated by how well it explains when
people dress up and when they do not. However, if this is the goal
of the inquiry, even if successful, it may be of relatively marginal
significance to those whose main interest is in understanding the
employment relationship, or other economic relationships that
involve nonlegal cooperation.
If, on the other hand, the claim is that a signaling model can
explain nonlegal cooperation, then one would expect it to be able
to provide an explanation for the stylized facts of the employment
relationship. One would, for example, want to know why and
when "structural" features are used in place of relying entirely on
signaling behavior24 Posner does not examine these features, so
we postpone a discussion of them for the next section.
Posner's example of the use of signals-the decision to inter-
view and hire a potential employee-is perhaps the most favor-
able case for signaling in the employment relationship. For an
initial encounter, when the interviewer has no other information
to use, signals using social norms can provide critical initial in-
formation, as explained by Posner.25 However, once employed, ac-
tual performance can be measured. The well-suited potential em-
ployee with the perfect manners may be offered the job, but once
on the job even further refinements in the employee's dress and
manners are unlikely to offset poor performance. Moreover, while
an employer may signal its intent to be a "good" employer by ex-
24. Examples of such "structural" features include joint investment in the cost of
training or following a practice of laying off workers during economic downturns instead of
reducing wage rates. In Posner's analysis, these practices fall outside his definition of "so-
cial norm." See id. at 11-35.
25. Id. at 13.
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tending signing bonuses, this type of "gift giving" will likely give
way to rewards based on performance. As noted above, this is not
to say that an employee who continues to signal cooperative
behavior, and an employer, who occasionally gives gifts, will not
strengthen an ongoing relationship. Rather, the point that we will
develop in the next section is that the behavioral regularities of
the employment relationship do not seem to be well explained by
the social signaling emphasized by Posner.26
If Posner's project is to explain social regularities, the relevant
question is whether those social regularities are norms. Is there a
penalty for not following the norm. Take, for example, showing up
for a job interview in a suit and tie (or, equivalently, in torn
jeans). If a good suit gets a prospective employee the higher wage
job, what prevents all prospective employees, whether cooperative
types or not, from buying the needed suit? Remember that for a
signal to provide accurate information to the employer, it must be
more costly for the non-cooperative types to use the signal com-
pared to the cooperative types. In addition, the costs to the non-
cooperative types have to be higher than the potential benefits.
If the benefits of signaling are greater than the cost of signal-
ing, the opportunistic non-cooperative type will arbitrage the
spread by buying the cheap signals and then cashing in the bene-
fit. In other words, the ill-suited potential employee will dress-
the-part to get the job, reap the benefits, and then enjoy life by
slacking off and being uncooperative. Our guess--which is just
that, a guess-is that most social norms can be copied at rela-
tively low cost, if the spread between the high and low wage job is
great enough. This is not to say that Pagan bikers can duplicate
the signal of Brioni suits and good manners, only that there are
enough non-cooperative individuals on the margin who can do so.
If that condition is satisfied, then the signal is likely to prove in-
accurate as norm arbitrageurs trade the signal.
There is, however, yet another possibility. Wearing a suit and
exhibiting other good social manners may not be a signal at all.
Other explanations may provide just as compelling an explana-
tion. Two alternatives are worth mentioning.
26. See id. at 18-27.
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A close cousin to the signaling model as used by Posner is the
matching model." Remember that in the signaling model, the ill-
suited employee shows bad manners because he does not know
any better. In the matching model, the same basic facts are given
an entirely different explanation. In this model the ill-suited per-
son is looking for a relaxed informal working environment where
casual dress is the norm. The well-mannered person is looking for
a more formal environment. The signaling here does not indicate
differences between good and bad cooperators. Both the well-
suited and ill-suited actors are good apples and are simply match-
ing their traits with those of the job. Neither is acting opportunis-
tically and there are no arbitrage opportunities.
Another explanation is that employers use dress and manners
to screen potential employees when those traits indicate a cul-
tural competence that is intrinsically related to the ability to per-
form on the job. Alternatively, dressing properly might indicate
awareness that breaching a firm's standards will trigger sanc-
tions, a sensitivity that is also related to one's ability to thrive in
a firm. In either case, the interviewer is screening by using traits
that are directly correlated with needed job traits. Consequently,
these traits are not a signal since to be a signal, the traits must
not only be costly and observable, but must also be irrelevant to
performance.2"
As the basis for a theory of the full employment relationship,
the signaling approach does not seem particularly promising.
First, the signaling model is most useful in cases of initial con-
tact, when the parties have little observable information to rely
on and are forced to substitute information obtained from signals.
This fits with Posner's use of the signaling model to explain the
decision to interview and hire prospective employees. But the hir-
ing decision itself, although not trivial, is comparatively small
change. Second, many of the features that seem to characterize
the employment relationship may not be signals in Posner's
sense. The stylized facts include many things that, while costly
and observable, are not arbitrary, but have a "necessary or in-
27. See Barbara Petrongolo & Christoper A. Pissarides, Looking in the Black Box: A
Survey of the Matching Function, 39 J. ECON. LITERATURE 390, 390 (2001).
28. See POSNER, supra note 1, at 24.
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trinsic connection to the beliefs that they provoke."29 Other
behaviors, like the wearing of a suit, are muddy.
This is not a criticism of the signaling model or of Posner's use
of that model. Rather, it is evidence that the goal of Posner's in-
quiry is to understand "social norms" and not to understand the
employment relationship, or the details of any other economic re-
lationship. If Posner's primary task is to understand the function-
ing of social norms as a way of developing nonlegal cooperation,
then one can also better understand his quick dismissal of com-
peting theories. If, however, his goal is to understand the regu-
larities of underlying economic relationships, such as the em-
ployment relationship, then other models are needed.
THE ROCK & WACHTER APPROACH
One of the models that Posner credits as having the power to
explain nonlegal cooperation, even in the social domain of pri-
mary interest to him, is bounded rationality. ° In the signaling
model, the primary problem is for the informed party to convey
inherently unverifiable information to an uninformed party. Pos-
ner's cooperative types develop signals that distinguish them
from uncooperative types. In the bounded rationality framework,
the informational problem facing individuals is a very different
one, as is the role played by norms. It is to this topic that we now
turn.
Posner's book, as we noted in the prior section, is in the inter-
section of the legal literature dealing with nonlegal norms of be-
havior and the economic literature of the signaling model.31 Our
work is also in the intersection of two literatures, with nonlegal
norms serving as one of the anchors and the economic literature
on bounded rationality and self-enforcing agreements as the
other. 32
29. Id. at 22-23.
30. See id. at 44.
31. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
32. The term bounded rationality was coined by Simon in the following manner: "The
capacity of the human mind for formulating and solving complex problems is very small
compared with the size of the problems whose solutions is required for objectively rational
behavior in the real world... ."See HERBERT A. SIMON, MODELS OF MAN 198 (1957).
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In our work, we define "norms" to be "nonlegally enforced rules
and standards" (what we have inelegantly labeled as NLERS).33
As such, these "norms" or NLERS reflect two principal conceptual
features of norms. First, they are more than mere behavioral
regularities: they are obligatory. 4 Second, they are not legally en-
forced, but are enforced through self-help, reputational sanctions,
or other nonlegal means."
The underpinnings of self-enforcing contracts and signaling
models, particularly of the kind adopted by Posner, are quite dif-
ferent from each other. As described above, the signaling model is
at its best when the parties are first establishing a relationship
and there is little observed data to use. The signaling model as-
sumes that the informed party fully understands her own skills
and cooperative nature and that the problem she faces is to con-
vince the uninformed party that she has those qualities she
claims to have. The signals used are correlated, but not causally
so, to the information to be conveyed. Uncertainty as to future
states of the world does not play a role.
In contrast to the signaling model, the self-enforcing agree-
ments model is most relevant when the parties are in an ongoing
relationship. While the signaling model assumes that the infor-
mational asymmetry involves the traits that are known to the in-
formed party, the informational problems in our setting involve
contractual incompleteness when unanticipated future states of
the world develop. The problem to be solved in the signaling
model is to convince the uninformed party that the informed
party is cooperative. The problem to be solved in our context is
the development of a governance structure to prevent the infor-
mationally informed party from using her advantage opportunis-
tically when an unanticipated state of the world occurs.
In earlier work, we have applied findings from the self-
enforcing economic literature to a number of settings, including
the employment relationship.36 We continue to use that example
in this section. In the NLERS model, the employee is hired and
33. Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Islands of Conscious Power: Law, Norms
and the Self-Governing Corporation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1619, 1641 (2001).
34. See id.
35. See id.
36. See, e.g., Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, The Enforceability of Norms and
the Employment Relationship, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1913, 1916-17 (1996).
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asked to be cooperative by extending high work effort regardless
of which future state of the world occurs. The decision to hire a
particular employee, however, is not determined by dress and
speech, but by whether the prospective employee is willing to
take a low wage for the training period. The training costs are
thereby shared. In the ongoing relationship, the employee's work
effort or cooperative nature remains unobservable, but either the
employee's output or some aspect of it is observable. As long as
his or her output remains satisfactory, the employee's wage is in-
creased with seniority. Thus, an employee's pay is tied to some
aspect of output rather than conditioned on some unrelated sig-
nal. In this model, the uncooperative employee does not profit by
taking the high wage job since, initially, the wage is not high.37
Thereafter, the uncooperative employee is unmasked when ob-
servable benchmarks are not met, and discharged. The goal of the
NLERS analysis is to identify the governance structure, in this
example the wage setting policy, that links wages to observable
benchmarks.
To make the problem more realistic, assume that the em-
ployee's output is not directly observable at low cost. In cases
where output is observable, it is also possible that output is a re-
sult of factors other than worker effort, say, for example, it could
be due to random variation in the productivity of the capital used
by the employee. Consequently, high output may occur when ef-
fort is low, and low output might occur if employee effort is high.
As long as the probability distribution of the random element is
known, an incentive based contract (that is, the governance struc-
ture) can be designed so that it is always in the interests of the
employee to extend high work effort. Since the employer commits
to follow the incentive-based contract, it suffers a clear reputa-
tional loss if it does not.3"
37. Notice how joint investments make the signaling model work more effectively.
Suppose a low cooperative type were able to learn the signals of the high cooperative type.
By using the appropriate social norms, the uncooperative type might be incorrectly hired.
If training costs were shared, however, the gains from arbitraging across signals would be
reduced. To make the model entirely self-enforcing, the employee's share of the training
cost would need to be greater than the difference between the entry wage for the high
wage job minus the non-cooperative type's opportunity wage.
38. ROBERT S. PINDYCK & DANIEL L. RUBINFELD, MACROECONOMICS 612 (5th ed.
2001).
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In our approach, these incentive-based devices, designed to en-
courage high work effort, constitute NLERS. They are behavioral
regularities that are followed because deviation is penalized,
namely, the low cooperative employee is discharged and the op-
portunistic employer suffers a loss in reputation. They are self-
enforcing in that the penalties cannot be, and do not need to be,
enforced or challenged in court.
Another example, which we develop in our article on the em-
ployment relationship, is the striking "stylized fact" of the non-
union workplace that employers and employees rarely avail
themselves of a straightforward legally enforceable contractual
solution, either through explicit individual employment contracts
or through collective bargaining agreements. 39 This pattern, we
argued, is best understood as a component of a self-enforcing gov-
ernance structure.40 The collection of these self-enforcing ar-
rangements or NLERS constitutes the governance structure of
the employment relationship.
First, opportunism is constrained by the structure of the rela-
tionship. The sharing of training costs is one example. Joint in-
vestments provide protection against opportunism. 41 It can even
help the signaling model work better. Take, for example, the case
of an opportunistic signaler who signaled that he would be a high
productivity employee when in fact he would not. The joint in-
vestments make it difficult for an opportunistic signaler to gain
because it removes much of the gain from arbitrage. Although the
non-cooperative type might have a lower opportunity wage, the
ability to cash in on high initial wage payments is removed.
Second, beyond the training period, the employer and employee
continue to make joint investments in their match. An array of
interesting practices emerges that protect against opportunism in
many different states of the world. For example, a stylized fact of
the non-union workplace is the widespread practice of responding
to economic downturn by laying off employees rather than reduc-
ing wages and the related practice of laying off cheaper more re-
cently trained employees before laying off more senior more
expensive employees.42 Both practices may initially seem odd.
39. Rock & Wachter, supra note 36, at 1921-27.
40. Id. at 1927.
4L See id. at 1923-24.
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pensive employees.42 Both practices may initially seem odd. Non-
union employers are legally entitled to reduce wages and legally
entitled to discharge the more senior employee before the more
junior employee. Moreover, such employers would save on wage
costs by doing so.
But this (legal) ability creates a danger that the employer will
behave opportunistically by misrepresenting a downturn in the
firm's business (as to which the employer knows more than the
employee) as a way of lowering wage costs and avoiding paying
the more senior employee for his or her investment in training.
By following the above practices, the employer makes credible its
claim of economic hardship (by incurring the reduction in output
that comes from reducing the number of employees) and protects
the employees' investments in training. The fact that firms often
buy out senior employees' investments by making severance
payments that are not legally required can be understood simi-
larly. The (nonlegally required) practice of "discharge only for
cause" is another such example.44
Third, behaving inconsistently with these practices opens em-
ployees and firms to criticism and sanctions. Thus, if an employer
unilaterally reduces wage rates, discharges a senior employee be-
fore a junior employee, or discharges an employee without cause,
the other employees can utilize a variety of "self help" measures
to sanction the employer directly. These measures include, for ex-
ample, "working to rule" (doing the bare minimum required) or
calling in sick. If necessary, market-based reputational effects
provide additional enforcement power. An employer with a repu-
tation for untrustworthiness will have more difficulty recruiting
employees.
Fourth, we argue that prominent legal doctrines, such as the
employment-at-will doctrine, are best understood as jurisdictional
doctrines rather than substantive standards." In other words, the
employment-at-will doctrine is the court's way of telling the par-
ties that they need to work things out themselves, that it will not
intervene. The importance of such doctrines, we argue, is that
they render the relationship self-governing by preventing either
42. Id. at 1921.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 1930-32.
45. See Rock & Wachter, supra note 33, at 1666.
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party from appealing to an outsider instead of working through
the self-governing structures of the relationship.46
We conclude that the employment relationship is best under-
stood as a self-governing relationship governed by nonlegally en-
forced rules and standards. In our analysis, the employment rela-
tionship is largely "norm-governed."
Our analysis achieves the following. We provide an explanation
for some striking observed regularities of the employment rela-
tionship and an account of the very limited role of legal rules in
rendering that relationship incentive compatible. As a replace-
ment for legal enforcement, we provide an explanation for why
the parties can rely on NLERS. That is, despite the legal rule
that an employer can discharge an employee for a bad reason or
no reason at all, the employer follows the NLERS of discharging
employees only for cause. Finally, we explain why it is not in the
interests of the parties to replace the legal doctrine of "employ-
ment-at-will" with a legally enforced rule of "discharge for
cause."
48
In pursuing this analysis, we are examining how a particular
relationship, the employment relationship, is structured in a par-
ticular institutional context, the firm. As such, the legal analysis
is linked to fundamental features of the economic theory of the
firm pioneered by Williamson, Hart and others. On this theory,
"norms" or NLERS are an outcome of the attempts by parties to
maximize their joint surplus and are, to that degree, endogenous.
We have expanded our intra-firm analysis beyond the employ-
ment relationship in a series of articles explaining key features of
corporate law. On our analysis, important features of corporate
law, such as the business judgment rule49 and the lock-in of mi-
nority shareholders,0 play important roles in facilitating and pro-
tecting the self-governance of firms through NLERS. Even when
legal enforceability is present, as in self-dealing transactions un-
46. See id. at 1667.
47. Rock & Wachter, supra note 36, at 1930.
48. See id. at 1932-38.
49. See Rock & Wachter, supra note 33, at 1666-70.
50. Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Waiting for the Omelet to Set: Match-
Specific Assets and Minority Oppression in the Close Corporation, in CONCENTRATED
CORPORATE OWNERSHIP 201, 209-14 (Randall F. Morck ed., 2000).
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der the duty of loyalty, the courts lean heavily on the self-
governing features of the corporation to make legal enforceability
workable.51
Because the norms that develop inside the firm are endogenous
to that institutional context, there is no particular expectation
that they should emerge elsewhere. They might develop because
of their self-enforcing properties, but other contexts might require
greater or lesser sanctions than those available through norm
governance. A good counter-example is the law of contracts.
Whereas the employment relationship and much of corporate law
is intra-firm, contracts are market relationships and are thus in-
ter-firm. Contracting parties obviously prefer to avoid disputes,
and will therefore rely to whatever extent is possible on self-
enforcing norms. One major difference is that the contracting par-
ties rarely use norms that serve as a jurisdictional boundary that
would make their norms entirely self-enforcing.52
Do THE ANALYSES MEET?
Is there a link between our concern with NLERS and Posner's
concern with the behavioral regularities that emerge from signal-
ing behavior? Does our "norms" analysis link up with Posner's
"norms" analysis? Are we talking about the same phenomena or
overlapping phenomena?
At first glance, the answer might seem to be no. Many of the
NLERS that we discuss, both in the employment relationship and
in the corporate context, cannot be understood as behavioral
regularities that emerge from a signaling game. From another di-
rection, many of them are not the same sort of conduct Posner
groups under the heading "social norms." So, perhaps we are just
interested in different problems and once the pervasive (and per-
haps disabling) ambiguity of the term "norm" is cleared away, the
lack of connection becomes manifest.
But this seems too quick for a number of reasons. First, we all
consider nonlegal mechanisms of cooperation to play a central
role. We are all interested in the subtle and sometimes counterin-
51. Rock & Wachter, supra note 33, at 1661-62.
52. See Rock and Wachter, supra note 36, at 1944-45.
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tuitive relationship between the law and nonlegal mechanisms of
cooperation. In both cases, reputation plays an important role in
enforcing norm adherence. Recall that, on our account, reputa-
tional sanctions are part of what renders the employment rela-
tionship incentive compatible. 3 For example, part (but only part)
of what makes the NLERS of "no discharge except for cause" suf-
ficiently binding on the employer to protect the employee from
employer opportunism is that failure to abide by that practice
impairs the employer's reputation in the external labor market,
thereby making it more costly to hire employees.5" Consequently,
we view norms in a similar way: behavioral regularities that are
enforced by the parties themselves or through reputational ef-
fects.
Moreover, by tying his framework to the signaling model, Pos-
ner can explain phenomena that we do not: the function of dis-
tinctively social norms. While others might believe that dress,
manners, and a large set of other similar social behavioral regu-
larities are largely that, regularities, Posner shows that they fall
under the rubric of norms because they are enforced by nonlegal
actors. Signaling models play a role in areas where our type of
norms, self-enforcing economic arrangements, do not: initial
meetings or informal contacts between actors who are unable, be-
cause of legal prohibitions or other factors, to cooperate with each
other formally. In such cases, the actors are unable to meet and
set arrangements that allow for the more formal, but still self-
enforcing, economic behavior that we describe.
But once the actors are able to fix arrangements, as in intra-
firm dealing or in contracting, we argue that most of these eco-
nomic relationships will be guided by economic arrangements
that make opportunism unprofitable, rather than by social norms
that signal whether an actor is a cooperative or non-cooperative
type. Our economic norms are arguably more binding and robust
than are Posner's social norms because the opportunistic actor
will either suffer a clear financial loss by acting opportunistically
or will suffer a reputational loss when the breach of the norm be-
comes known to other actors. Posner's social norms, operating in
an intra-firm or contracting relationship, generate softer sanc-
tions. In particular, to the extent that the parties adhere to their
53. Id. at 1931.
54. Id. at 1948
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informal working arrangements, failure to give gifts, to dress ap-
propriately, or to act with the requisite manners does not trigger
a financial loss between the actors. Any reputational loss will be
muted by the actor's otherwise cooperative behavior.
Posner might question whether the business-related self-
enforcing agreements that we cite should be described as norms.
After all, because adherence is driven by economic self-interest,
what is added by using the term norm to describe these arrange-
ments? Why not reserve the term norm for the softer, less self-
interested social behavior described by Posner? The reason is that
some of Posner's social norms, indeed all those that affect eco-
nomic relationships, work the same way. The prospective em-
ployee suits up for an interview in the hope of financial reward:
she is maximizing a profit or utility function given a cost con-
straint. In Spence's original signaling model, the signaler sig-
naled to gain a monetary reward.55 The social norms that are not
enforced through the hope of profit are enforced through the hope
of utility improvement. That is, the decision to adhere or to defect
from the cooperative mode, involving a purely social norm, is
made by maximizing utility given to reputational cost constraint,
which itself may be expressed in utility terms.
If norms are behavioral regularities that are obligatory because
of nonlegal sanctions, then, in both models norms are followed
only when it is in the interest of the affected parties to adhere to
them. This is no less true of economic arrangements than it is of
social arrangements. The calculus of adherence or defection is the
same. The key distinction between obligatory behavioral regulari-
ties is not whether the penalty is economic or social, but whether
the penalty is legally enforced or nonlegally enforced. In the end,
both models use the concept of norms in the same manner: to ex-
plain nonlegal cooperation in institutions. By explaining different
pieces of the puzzle, our theories are complementary rather than
competitive.
55. SPENCE, supra note 2, at 355.
